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tions of various undesirable activities will be seriously hindered. Any
required self-recognition of an illegal activity through registration for a
tax can easily be found to be self-incriminatory as it requires the individual
to classify himself as a participant in contraband activities. The only
prospects for federal prosecution and control seem to rely upon new legislation unrelated to control through registration and taxation. Leary does
not specifically outlaw such methods. However, it definitely makes it
extremely difficult to continue regulations. New legislation based upon
governmental regulation through the power to regulate interstate commerce has been proposed."2 Apart from the possibilities of success of this
bill, it might be well to question the necessity of federal control of substances such as marijuana beyond that involved with strict interstate
commerce.

Richard D. Pullman

The Lost or Stolen Credit Card - A New Burden Imposed
on the Card Holder
Duke was issued a credit card by Sears after he had signed a "Sears Revolving Charge Account Agreement" which purportedly bound him to
pay for all purchases made on his Sears credit card. Subsequently, Duke's
credit card, which he had not signed, was stolen.' Duke was unaware of
the theft, and from December 13, 1965, to January 12, 1966, the thief
charged over $1,200 to Duke's account. Duke refused to pay for the unauthorized purchases and Sears brought suit.
The jury found that neither Duke nor Sears was negligent,' and the trial
court held that Duke was liable under the contract for the amount of
the unauthorized purchases. The court of civil appeals ordered a new trial
on the grounds that Sears had failed to offer sufficient proof of exercise of
care, on the occasion of each sale, to ascertain the identity of the card
holder.' Held, reversed and remanded: Unless circumstances present cause
for further inquiry, a seller is entitled to rely on a credit card alone as
identification, and the burden of proof is on the card holder to show that
the seller failed to exercise ordinary care. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke,
441 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1969).
I.

ALLOCATING THE Loss FROM UNAUTHORIZED PURCHASES

The lost or stolen credit card problem is unique to the twentieth century. There have been few cases decided in this area, and thus no consistent
42

"The Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1969," known as S. 2637, and as the "Dirksen

Bill."
' The court accepted an inference that the thief signed the card in his own handwriting. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. 1969).

' The jury found that Duke was not negligent in failing to sign his credit card, and this point
was not in issue on appeal. Id.
a Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 433 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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body of law has been established. In Wanainaker v. Megary,4 decided in
1915, a lost coin which was issued for the same purpose as a credit card
was equated with a negotiable instrument. The Pennsylvania court held
that an innocent seller who issued credit in reliance on the coin had the
same rights as a holder in due course. Thus, an innocent seller could recover from an innocent card holder in the same manner that a holder in
due course could recover from a drawer or maker of a negotiable instrument. However, this theory has not been followed, even in Pennsylvania.
In 1923 the New Jersey supreme court in Lit Bros. v. Haines' refused
to hold a coin holder' liable for unauthorized purchases because there was
no agreement by the coin holder to be liable for purchases made by persons
other than himself. Since that decision, practically all lost or stolen credit
card cases have involved an agreement by the card holder to pay for all
purchases made by anyone presenting the card.' However, it remained
to be decided how strictly such agreements were to be interpreted. One
court held that the agreement applied only to authorized purchases,' while
a Texas court in a later case, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan,"° held
the card holder strictly liable under the agreement. In the latter case the
card holder had loaned his credit card to a third party for the purpose of
making certain authorized purchases, and the authority was exceeded to the
extent of $43 1. The court said that the card holder was liable for the purchases until such time as notice was given or the card was surrendered.
Queries have been made as to whether such agreements are unconscionable or of the "adhesion contract" class." The adhesion contract characterization is not as apt to be applied to a credit card agreement because it
does not concern the sale of products but only the privilege to buy on
credit, and the customer still has the option to buy the products on a cash
basis. " No state has prohibited this type of agreement. However, Illinois
and Massachusetts limit maximum recovery by the card issuer to $75 and
$100 respectively," and New York has a statute which requires that the
print containing the credit card agreement be of a prescribed minimum
size before a credit card holder may be held liable for the amount of unS24 Pa. Dist. 778 (Philadelphia Mun. Ct. 1915).
'Gulf Ref. Co. v. Plotnick, 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935). This case was decided under
rules of negligence, and the court refused to apply the rules of negotiable instruments to a lost
credit card.
698 N.J.L. 658, 121 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
'Id. The coin was issued for the same purpose as a credit card.
8Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945); Diners Club,
Inc. v. Whited, Civil No. A10872 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., App. Dep't, Cal., Aug. 6, 1964); Jones
Store Co. v. Kelly, 36 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931); Allied Stores v. Funderburke, 52
Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967); Union Oil Co. v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349
P.2d 243 (1960); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McMillan, 168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
"Jones Store Co. v. Kelly, 36 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1931).
1'168 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). The agreement read: "The named holder shall be
responsible for all purchases made by the use of this card . . . whether or not such purchases are
made by the named holder."
'" Comment, Applicability of Exculpatory Clause Principles to Credit Card Risk Shifting
Clauses, 22 LA. L. REv. 640 (1962).
"' An "adhesion contract" is defined as "a term descriptive of standard form printed contracts
prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a 'take it or leave it' basis. The law has recognized there is often no true equality or bargaining power .....
" Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins,
347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965).
18See note 25 infra.
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authorized purchases made on his lost or stolen credit card.' This was obviously an attempt by the New York legislature to make a credit card
holder aware of the risk he is taking, but it also reflects reluctance to
prohibit this type of contract.
While the courts were applying the rules of contract in finding a credit
card holder liable for unauthorized purchases, they were also applying
rules of negligence. Gulf Refining Co. v. Plotnicki' established the rule
that the card owner and the card issuer-seller must exercise due care, the
former in the custody of the card, and the latter in honoring the card.
The requirement for exercise of due care continues to be a basis for determining responsibility for the loss which results from the unauthorized
use of a credit card.'
Since 1960 the most frequently cited case involving a lost or stolen
credit card has been Union Oil Co. v. Lull." This case involved a credit
card agreement which provided that the card holder would pay for purchases made by anyone presenting the card until notice of loss or theft.
The card holder was found to be without negligence in his use of the card.
The court placed on the card issuer-seller the burden of proving that the
seller (service station dealers) exercised reasonable care in making credit
card sales to the thief. In making this decision the court stated:
If [proof of identity]" cannot be shown and there are no other circumstances
from which the dealer can reasonably infer that the customer is the person
named on the credit card, the sale is made at the dealer's risk.... If the card
is presented by a customer who does not claim to be the card owner but
claims only that he is authorized to use the card, the dealer assumes the risk
of loss on the sale unless he is furnished evidence that would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that the claimed authority was given ....
The burden of
proving that reasonable inquiry was made is upon the [seller] '

This conclusion almost automatically places the loss on the dealer and
card issuer. Store clerks, gas station attendants, and ticket agents are unlikely to remember one specific sale in sufficient detail to prove that they
exercised due care, and present identification practices are too lax to support an inference that due care is usually exercised."0
II. SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co. v. DUKE

The Texas supreme court in Sears rejected the rule adopted in Union
Oil, and held that the seller need not demand more identification than the
credit card as a matter of normal procedure. 1 In its comparison of the two
4

N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW S 512 (McKinney 1968).
" 24 Pa. D. & C. 147 (C.P. 1935).
s" Gulf Ref. Co. v. Williams Roofing Co., 208 Ark. 362, 186 S.W.2d 790 (1945); Diners Club,
Inc. v. Whited, Civil No. A10872 (Los Angeles Super Ct., App. Dep't, Cal., Aug. 6, 1964); Allied
Stores v. Funderburke, 52 Misc. 2d 872, 277 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1967); Union Oil Co.
v. Lull, 220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
17220 Ore. 412, 349 P.2d 243 (1960).
"9 The court stated that adequate proof of identity would ordinarily be established by the possession of the usual cards carried in a billfold, such as driver's license, fishing license, social security
card or the like, bearing the same name as that appearing on the credit card. 349 P.2d at 254.
"9Id. (emphasis added).
"5 Comment, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 77 YALE L.J. 1418 (1968).
" Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Duke, 441 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. 1969).
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cases the court stated that the function of the credit card was proof of
identity and that it should be considered satisfactory evidence of the identity of the holder or authorized user, unless the appearances or circumstances would raise a question in the mind of a reasonable seller. Also, the

court took an opposite view as to the burden of proof and stated: "Proof
that the seller did fail to use ordinary care in this respect is a defense to the
liability of the holder of the card, and the burden of proof should be
placed on the [card holder]."2 In comparing the two cases the Texas court
made no distinction of the fact that Union Oil involved a card without a
signature block and that Sears did involve a card with a signature block.
It appears that the court intended that its standard for identification be
the same regardless of the presence or absence of a signature block.
The soundness of the decision in Sears is supported by the fact that it
preserves the right of parties to a credit card agreement to form an enforceable contract of their own choosing, and also establishes a standard
of care which is commensurate with prevailing credit card practices. The
court's awareness of prevailing credit card practices was manifested when
it stated: "When Duke himself made a purchase and presented his credit
card, he would not expect to be questioned. He should not expect the disguised thief to be." 2 In effect the court considered the realities of the
credit card business, and for that reason refused to follow the impractical
requirements established by the Oregon court in Union Oil. However, it
must be remembered that the Texas court did not imply a license for a
seller to engage in careless or negligent credit card practices, and when
"suspicious circumstances" are present, the duty to make further inquiry
still exists.
III. CONCLUSION

Sears, Roebuck f Co. v. Duke may lead to new problems. Since a seller

is now entitled to rely on the credit card alone as identification (unless
cause is presented for further inquiry), and since the burden of proof for
ascertaining the seller's lack of care is on the card holder, the issuers of
credit cards may be encouraged to issue cards in a form which will present
the least chance to raise a "suspicious circumstance." For example, if the
card is printed without a signature block, there will be less chance to find
a seller negligent in making credit sales to unauthorized persons on a
forged signature. Conversely, there will be a higher probability of being
found negligent if an unauthorized sale is made to a thief presenting a
credit card having a photograph and signature of the card holder."
Legislation governing the format of credit cards and the liabilities of
card holders would give needed protection to the public. Otherwise, an
innocent card holder whose credit card is stolen will be at the mercy of
the card issuer-seller who, until notice of loss or theft is received, can
2

Id. (emphasis added).

2'Id. at 523.
24Massachusetts requires that the card issuer provide a place on the card for the identification
of the card holder, which must include a space for a signature or a photograph. MAss. ANN. LAWs
ch. 255, § 12E (Supp. 1968).

